The neurobiology of moral sense: facts or hypotheses? by unknown
Marazziti et al. Annals of General Psychiatry 2013, 12:6
http://www.annals-general-psychiatry.com/content/12/1/6REVIEW Open AccessThe neurobiology of moral sense: facts or
hypotheses?
Donatella Marazziti*, Stefano Baroni, Paola Landi, Diana Ceresoli and Liliana Dell’OssoAbstract
One of the most intriguing frontiers of current neuroscientific research is represented by the investigation of the
possible neural substrates of morality. The assumption is that in humans an innate moral sense would exist. If this is
true, with no doubt it should be regulated by specific brain mechanisms selected over the course of evolution, as
they would promote our species’ survival. In the last decade, an increasing number of studies have been carried
out to explore the neural bases of human morality.
The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive review of the data regarding the neurobiological origin of the
moral sense, through a Medline search of English-language articles from 1980 to February 2012.
The available findings would suggest that there might be a main integrative centre for the innate morality, in
particular the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, with its multiple connections with the limbic lobe, thalamus and
brainstem. The subjective moral sense would be the result of an integration of multiple automatic responses,
mainly associated with social emotions and interpretation of others’ behaviours and intentions.
Since converging observations outline how lesions of the proposed neural networks may underlie some personality
changes and criminal behaviours, the implications of the studies in this field encompass many areas of the scientific
domain.
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Frontotemporal dementiaIntroduction
The issue of the moral nature of man, that had begun in
the ancient Greece some thousands of years ago, has been
essentially debated within the realm of philosophy, and
subsequently of theology and jurisprudence. For a long
time morality was considered to be an immaterial concept
and, therefore, the possibility of exploring it empirically
was postulated only in recent years. The scientific ap-
proach to the question stems essentially from the conver-
gence of different lines of research. First, principles seem
to exist in our species, those referred to by some authors
as “moral or social-moral emotions”, which are linked to
the interests and wellbeing of a society or group rather
than of single individuals [1]. Second, given that they are
fundamental in promoting the group cohesion, it is as-
sumed that they were already present in our primitive an-
cestors, and that they constituted a crucial factor for the* Correspondence: dmarazzi@psico.med.unipi.it
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orsurvival of our species (e.g., the importance of food shar-
ing in periods of famine). The feelings of guilt, gratitude
and pity are typical examples of emotions with a strong
social value.
A great support to the possible neurological bases of
moral sense derived from the observations of patients
presenting sudden changes in their social interactions as
a consequence of cerebral lesions, together with studies
on normal and pathological behaviours using neuroim-
aging techniques [2-4].
Although most of the evidence which will be presented
in this paper is still matter of controversy and lively dis-
cussion, the possibility is emerging that in the near fu-
ture a branch of cognitive neuroscience will be devoted
exclusively to the study of the biological mechanisms
underlying the moral sense [5]. The aim of this paper is
to present a comprehensive review of the data regarding
the neurobiological origin of the moral sense, together
with some theoretical, clinical and legal implications, on
the basis of a medline search of English-language articlesal Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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words: moral sense, social emotions, neural networks,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sociopathy, brain im-
aging, frontotemporal dementia.
Historical background
Besides the great philosophers, such as Plato, Kant, and
Hume, just to mention some of the most distinguished,
who raised the question of the nature of the moral sense,
one of the first who attempted to study empirically sociop-
athy, and, therefore, indirectly the moral sense, was Cesare
Lombroso, an Italian physician who developed his an-
thropological theory of delinquency over the course of the
five editions of his “L’uomo Delinquente” (“The Delinquent
Man”) [6], first published in 1876. After measuring the
form and size of the head of several criminals, he con-
cluded that the somatic traits characteristic of these indi-
viduals were similar to those of primitive men, and that
their antisocial tendencies were present at birth and, there-
fore, hereditary. Amongst psychiatrists, Philippe Pinel pro-
vided one of the most exhaustive descriptions of those
forms of behaviours that subsequently were labeled as psy-
chopathic. In 1806 he coined the expression “manie sans
delire” (mania without delusion), to underline how this
condition was characterized by the presence of cruel be-
haviours, with no impairment of cognition, perception, or
memory [7]. Individuals with this disorder often behave in
impulsive and socially unacceptable manners, while being
fully conscious of the irrationality and of the destructive
consequences of their actions. Independently from Pinel,
more or less in the same period, the American physician
Benjamin Rush described a similar condition that was
labeled as “moral derangement” in his work “Medical
Inquiries and Diseases of the Mind” of 1812 [8]. Like Pinel,
Rush reported cases of subjects who showed deviant be-
haviours with no sense of regret, guilt or preoccupations
for the negative consequences of their actions, and em-
phasized the irresponsible and antisocial nature of such in-
dividuals. In 1874, Henry Maudsley hypothesized the
existence of a specific cerebral centre for moral feelings;
according to him, there would be individuals who, since
their birth, lack these feelings [9]. In the period between
the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th
century, in the different editions of his “Psychiatrie: Ein
Lehrbuch” (Textbook of Psychiatry) Emil Kraepelin [10]
examined extensively the so-called “psychopathic syn-
drome”. Especially in the second edition of his manual, he
underlined how mentally-ill individuals lacking a moral
sense may present a congenital deficit to stop or delay
their selfish drives. In the fifth edition (1896), for the first
time, he defined such a condition as “psychopathic state”
and stated that these constitutional disorders could expose
such affected individuals to the development of personality
disorders over the entire duration of their lives. In thefollowing edition (1899), he considered the psychopathic
states to be but one category of the many forms of mental
degeneration including also obsessive syndromes and sex-
ual perversion.
Towards the middle of 1800, the case of Phineas Gage,
undoubtedly the most famous neurological patient of all
times, had great resonance and opened unexpected hori-
zons in the interpretation of the neurological bases of
personality [11-13] Phineas Gage was a young man liv-
ing in New England, working as a foreman in a company
that had the task of laying down the tracks for a new
railway line. According to his supervisors, Gage was effi-
cient and serious, and could perform his job with ex-
treme precision and concentration: he had, in fact, to
carefully organize in advance the position of explosive
charges. One day, in 1848, when he was 25 years old, he
was involved in a tragic accident when a charge ex-
ploded in front of his face. A metal bar entered his left
cheek, pushed up through the base of his skull, crossed
through the frontal portion of his brain, and went out
from the top of his head, falling down at a distance of
about thirty meters. Gage was hurled to the ground,
dazed and unable to speak, but still conscious. After a
few months of convalescence, he had completely recov-
ered physically, and had restored normal hearing and
speaking abilities, as well as bodily movements. He only
suffered from the loss of vision in his left eye, while his
right eye was normal. Unfortunately, as reported by the
physicians who took care of him, he had lost “the equi-
librium between his intellectual abilities and his animal
tendencies”. These changes became overt as soon as the
acute phase of the brain lesion had disappeared. Again
according to the medical reports of his time, “he was in-
solent, bizarre, capable of the most vulgar profanity,
which he had never used before, showed little regard to-
wards his peers, was intolerant of limitations or advices
which were in contrast with his own desires, and was al-
ways ready to elaborate plans for future activities that he
would shortly thereafter abandon. His language was so
obscene that women were advised not to remain too
long in his presence”. These new aspects of Gage’s per-
sonality were completely at odds with the “moderate
habits” and with the “great strength of character” that he
had always demonstrated before the accident. His friends
and family no longer recognized him. When he returned
to his former employers, they refused to hire him: the
problem was not in any particular deficiency of ability or
in physical capacity, but in his new character. Gage’s
story is important because it became evident for the first
time that, within the human brain, there were systems
that regulated personality and individual behaviours.
Brain damage could impair the ethical rules and social
conventions, with no impairment of linguistic or reason-
ing skills. There was something in the brain involved in
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such as the possibility to anticipate the future and to plan
specific actions in a given social context and the sense of
responsibility towards oneself and others. The case of
Phineas Gage remains emblematic because it highlights
how to follow social conventions, behave morally and
make advantageous choices require not just knowledge of
rules and strategies, but the integrity of specific cerebral
systems. Since that time, a series of data have been accu-
mulated to support these preliminary concepts.
Besides the evidence coming from the clinical observations
in the field of neurology, fundamental data derived also from
the studies carried out by Konrad Lorenz in the last century,
and from his descriptions of complex social behaviours in
animals, which paved the way for the interpretation of sev-
eral human aspects from an evolutionary perspective [14,15].
It is possible that feelings such as the unwillingness to harm
the others, the sense of justice, empathy, and the so-called
“theory of mind”, a term defining the capacity to understand
the thoughts, feelings, and emotions of the others, developed
because of their utility in the survival of man, while promot-
ing cooperation [16-20]. Therefore, it is assumed that an in-
nate morality exists within the human brain, which seems
similar to all those mechanisms developed over the course
of the evolution that had favored the survival of the individ-
ual within a social group. If the moral sense is innate, it
should be regulated by specific neural patterns, and therefore
it is not surprising that it can be altered by the presence of
certain neurological disorders. Much evidence in this sense
is derived from functional magnetic nuclear resonance
(fMRI) studies in healthy subjects, from neurological data on
sociopathic individuals [21-26], and from investigations inFigure 1 The possible circuits of the “moral” brain, with the ventrom
centre with all its connections to other cortical, limbic, hypothalamicpatients presenting focal cerebral lesions or frontotemporal
dementia (FTD) [27-31]. The contributions of Damasio and
coworkers are fundamental in this sense [3,4]. They demon-
strated how emotions play a key role in those cognitive pro-
cesses which imply moral judgment. The process through
which moral emotions operate is thought to be mostly un-
conscious, but the access of these emotions into the con-
sciousness is so rapid that they seem to be strongly rooted in
the higher cognitive functions. Therefore, although moral
judgment has long been related to verbal and rational pro-
cesses, the integrity of these processes with a concomitant
impairment of the emotional mechanisms, do not warrant
moral behaviour in daily life. Interestingly, Damasio and his
coworkers set up specific tests for the investigation of pa-
tients with minimal brain lesions who showed significant
personality and behavioral changes, in the context of nor-
mal scoring within traditional neuropsychological investi-
gations [3,4,11]. The emerging data, although still limited,
would indicate the presence of an innate brain network
for the moral sense, with the right ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) representing the main integrating centre
with all its connections to limbic, hypothalamic and brain-
stem areas [32] (Figure 1).
Definition of moral sense
The moral sense can be defined as that code of values and
customs which informs social conduct. In philosophy, it is
often divided into “descriptive” and “normative”. This
distinction goes back to a debate already present in the
pre-socratic era, regarding the possible existence of an
universal normative moral sense which would flank de-
scriptive codes proposed by a society, religion, or legaledial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) representing the main integrating
and brainstem areas.
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established by a given society or group which decides what
is right and what is wrong: generally, besides not harming
the others, it is focussed on the acceptance of authority,
and emphasizes the respect of group rules [33]. Normative
morality, instead, is that universal code of rules and prohi-
bitions followed by all individuals endowed with reason,
above and beyond whatever has been established by the
society or the group to which he/she belongs, and is espe-
cially centered around the notion of not harming [33,34].
Antigone, in the homonymous Greek tragedy, makes ex-
plicit reference to this innate morality when speaking of
“laws not written, inalterable. . . For their life is not of to-
day or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows
when they were first put forth.” [35].
Some moral attitudes were likely already present in our
hominid ancestors: in particular, it is thought that they were
capable of assimilating rules based on a system of reward/
punishment, and of attributing and perceiving others’ inten-
tions, feelings, and desires [1,36,37]. The primates closest to
man present a range of social behaviours similar to some
found in our own species. For example, chimpanzees show
an altruistic capacity and a sort of sense of justice,
interpreted as antecedents of human morality. There is no
doubt that in man the range of emotions and feelings with a
moral basis has markedly broadened, and always includes a
social component. Just consider faithfulness, shame, embar-
rassment, gratitude, compassion, pride, the fear of being
negatively judged by others, and indignation when coping
with unfair behaviours, all emotions which lead individuals
to act in a way which is socially acceptable, and which in
general have impact upon the surrounding environment
[38-40]. These emotions or feelings permit to us to perceive
rapidly the moral implications of relationships with others,
and, therefore, of acting accordingly to neither diminish nor
increase one’s own reputation, in order to obtain greater pos-
sibilities of some future social cooperation [41]. According to
evolutionary psychology and social neuroscience, moral feel-
ings would be the expression of drives deriving from evolu-
tion, such as not harming others, honesty, group spirit, and
the sense of authority. Amongst these, the most important
might be the aversion to harm and the deep sense of uneasi-
ness when harming another individual [42], along with the
sense of justice, shown by the need to punish rebels or those
who break the rules [21,43]. On the other hand, moral emo-
tions carried to the extreme and addressed to the preserva-
tion of one’s own group, like indignation and contempt, may
be at the basis of xenophobia and social conflicts.
Functional magnetic nuclear resonance (fMNR) studies
The fMNR was utilized only recently to explore the pos-
sible neuroanatomical substrates of the moral sense gener-
ally in healthy subjects during tasks involving their moral
judgment [22-26,42]. From these studies it emerged thatthe brain areas potentially involved would be the (VMPFC,
Brodman’s areas, BA 10–12, 25, 32) and the adjacent
orbitofrontal (BA 47, portions of BA 10–12 and 25, and
BA 44), the ventrolateral cortex (OFC/VL), the amygdala,
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
[22-24,26,42]; It is believed that one of the main roles of
the VMPFC is to attribute moral and emotional values to
social stimuli, anticipate their future outcome, and modu-
late the mechanism of the theory of mind and empathy, as
well as to perceive the others' intentions [11,44-46]. The
OFC/VL region would mediate aversive responses related
to the social context, modify responses based on feed-
back, and inhibits automatic-impulsive behaviours trig-
gered by the amygdala [47-49].The amygdala, located in
the antero-medial temporal lobes, modulates responses
to situations or stimuli perceived as frightening or dan-
gerous, even through the recognition of specific facial ex-
pressions [50-53]. The DLPFC would modulate this
network, since it is at the basis of the reasoning applied
to different moral questions [26]. Furthermore, during
some particular tasks in healthy subjects, other brain re-
gions begin to activate in particular the anterior insula
[43], the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
[54-56] the anterior cingulate gyrus [57] the inferior par-
ietal lobes and the temporo-parietal junctions
[19,20,54,58] the mesolimbic pathway and the ventral
striatum, the precuneus [58] and the posterior cingulate
[54-56]. The VMPFC, especially the right one seems to
play a fundamental role in the innate moral sense, as it
becomes activated during tasks requiring explicit moral
judgments, such as the presentation of a “personal”
moral dilemma which involves the possibility that the
participant may provoke a severe harm to someone
[23,59,60] By contrast, the presentation of general moral
dilemmas seems to activate mainly the DLPFC [42].
However, a subsequent work would suggest an integra-
tion between emotional and cognitive processes in both
personal and general dilemmas [26,61].
Besides the ban to harm others, moral feelings serve
to reinforce the rules of the group, by attributing a nega-
tive judgment to certain actions, and punishing those
who do not follow the rules [21,62,63] “Altruistic pun-
ishment” is considered a manifestation of the moral de-
sire for justice and fairness, and seems to involve an
increased activation of the VMPFC [63,64]. This altruis-
tic punishment is strongly dependent on the fact that
others, especially those who carry a bad reputation, de-
liberately act against the rules [63,65]. Although not dir-
ectly linked to altruistic punishment, sometimes the
“Ultimatum Game”, a neuropsychological test, is used to
explore the sense of equity, fairness and justice that are
related to altruistic punishment. In this case, a player is
asked to divide a sum of money with a second player
who can either accept or reject this proposal. If the
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second player accepts, the money is split according to
the proposal [66]. The fMNR scans of individuals playing
the Ultimatum Game showed that the VMPFC appears
to be involved in the attribution and interpretation of
the others’ intentions through their behavior [16]. The
OFC/VL (BA47), the anterior insula, and the amygdala,
especially the right one [64,67], consequently put into act
the altruistic punishment, by eliciting feelings of social
aversion and/or exclusion, such as anger, indignation, dis-
gust, and contempt [45,63,68-70]. The theory of mind and
empathy are two processes that are strictly related to mor-
ality, and these, too, involve the VMPFC, an area which is
thought to be involved also in the understanding of the
feelings, thoughts and convictions of others [57,71,72].
The cognitive aspect of empathy, such as perceiving an-
other’s point of view and identifying with it (social cogni-
tion), involves a part of the VMPFC, especially the areas
BA10,11; this is a phylogenetically new system, found only
in chimpanzees and in the more highly-evolved mammals
[17,18,73-76]. By contrast, the most emotional aspect of
empathy, such as the “emotional” contagion, is mediated
by the OFC/VL (BA44), through an older neural system
[17,74,77-79]. It is hypothesized that certain characteris-
tics, like the perception of the self as an active agent and
the evaluation of the similarity between oneself and others,
can influence the “cognitive” empathy and the activity of
the VMPFC. This suggests that the VMPFC could be in-
volved in the interaction “self/other than self”, or in the in-
fluence that the emotional and mental states of one
individual may have on those of another [70,80]. When
the others' intentions and emotions are internalized or im-
itated by a subject, other areas activate to modulate the
“self/other than self” interaction, probably the mirror neu-
rons of the OFC/VL [74,81-89]. The brain areas engaged
by judging others’ emotional states and the forgivability of
their behaviours/crimes include left superior frontal gyrus,
orbitofrontal gyrus and precuneus. Empathy activates also
left anterior middle temporal and left inferior frontal gyri,
while forgiveness activates also posterior cingulate gyrus
and right caudate nucleus [90-92]. In addition, the right
temporal-parietal junction, previously implicated in rea-
soning about others’ thoughts, beliefs and intention in
moral and non- moral contexts, seems to be activated in
mitigating blame for accidental harms and, therefore, in
forgiveness [93].
In the case that the “self” is threatened by the super-
iority of others (envy) [57], there is the involvement of
the anterior cingulate area, or of the ventral striatum
when the pleasure is derived from the misfortune of
others (only in the German language there is a term,
“Schadenfreude”, to indicate this feeling). As far as mir-
ror neurons are concerned, this is a class of neurons
which selectively are activated by both when an action iscarried out by an individual or he/she observes that ac-
tion being performed by others. The neurons of the ob-
server “mirror” what is taking place in the mind of the
observed subject, as if it were the observer that was car-
rying out the action [76,94]. The areas activated during
the observation of behaviour of the other individuals are
the anterior rostral portion of the inferior parietal lobe,
the inferior part of the anterior central gyrus, and the
posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus. In some
cases, the activation of the anterior area of the inferior
frontal gyrus and of the dorsal pre-motor cortex have
been reported. The ability of the human brain to self-
activate when the emotions of others are perceived,
expressed through facial mimicry, gestures, and the tone
of voice, and the ability of immediately decoding this
perception in “visceromotor” terms, enables every indi-
vidual to act according to the so-called “empathic par-
ticipation” [59,83]. This represents a form of bio-social
behaviour, prior to linguistic communication, that char-
acterizes and triggers inter-individual relations, which
are at the basis, perhaps, of all social behaviours. It must
be underlined, however, that, as fascinating as all this
might be, these are only hypotheses, given that mirror
neurons have been found only in motor areas.
Brain areas and sociopathic behaviour
Generally sociopathic individuals are defined as those
lacking a sense of morality, empathy, regret or guilt for
their actions, who feel little or no pity, or who manifest a
cold and calculated aggression, without alterations of
their higher cognitive processes [69,95]. Generally, they
show limited alterations in cardiac frequency, in skin
conductance or in respiratory activity, when they look at
frightening or unpleasant pictures, and they demonstrate
other blunted responses of the autonomic nervous sys-
tem, when facing the others' suffering, as well as an im-
pairment to recognize sad or frightened expressions
[96-99]. Studies aimed at exploring possible brain abnor-
malities in criminals are quite limited, and, in any case,
must be considered with cautions, given the small size of
the samples, their heterogeneity, and the presence of
potential-confounding factors, such as drug abuse. A
high percentage (two-thirds) of a sample of murderers
fulfilled the criteria for a neurological diagnosis, such as
brain trauma, mental retardation, cerebral paralysis, epi-
lepsy, and dementia [100]. Further, some criminals often
display unspecific alterations at temporal level, or dis-
turbance of other brain areas which can be detected by
electroencephalogram or through more sophisticated
neuroimaging techniques [101]. In institutionalized pa-
tients, the use of neuropsychological tests permitted to ob-
serve deficits of some frontal functions, such as an
inability to modify one’s own responses (response reversal
learning), or to inhibit risky behaviour following a negative
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who had been convicted not guilty for mental infirmity,
or in violent psychiatric patients, hypometabolism and
hypoperfusion of the frontotemporal areas have been de-
scribed [97,101,103,108-110]. Voxel-based morphometry,
a technique based on a systematic comparison of the
values of pixels amongst different subjects, seems to sug-
gest a correlation between the reduction of gray matter at
both frontopolar and OFC/VL level and an increase in the
degree of psychopathy [111,112]. Sometimes, a decreased
volume of prefrontal gray matter associated with a lower
level of autonomic activation has been described in crimi-
nals responsible for cruent acts [95]. Further, the more
reduced is the volume of the prefrontal cortex, the greater
is the tendency towards antisocial behavior [113]. Non-
affective and insensitive children seem to present a greater
amount of gray matter in the medial frontal regions, which
seems to suggest a delay in cortical maturation [114]. Be-
sides the abnormalities in the frontal lobe, some socio-
pathic individuals show a reduced functionality of the
amygdala [115] which, as already noted, modulates anxiety
and fear responses. Such an information is necessary for
the development of socialization based on moral princi-
ples [69,116,117], as well as the recognition of the emo-
tional value of sensorial experiences and face expressions
[50]. In fact, animal studies show that an early amygdala
dysfunction may block the normal development of the
VMPFC and of the OFC/VL. It is, therefore, hypothesized
that in some forms of sociopathy, early amygdala alter-
ations could provoke dysfunctions of the VMPFC and of
the OFC/VL, which would lead to an erroneous associ-
ation between actions that are harmful to others and nega-
tive reinforcement of the discomfort of the victim.
Studies on patients with brain lesions
The story of Phineas Gage, described above, is currently a
milestone in neurology, as it demonstrated for the first
time, and unequivocally, that moral judgment requires the
integrity of specific cerebral systems. Thanks to recently
developed techniques, it was possible to better explore the
cerebral areas mainly involved in the Gage's case, in par-
ticular the VMPFC [11]. Nowadays the contributions com-
ing from studies on patients whose clinical conditions are
similar to those of Gage showed that deficit involving
VMPFC and the nearby OFC/VL [98,118] may modify the
moral sense. Furthermore, some evidence indicates that
alterations of the right frontal lobe can be associated with
some abnormal social behaviours, while those of left
frontal lobe can be linked to outbursts of anger and vio-
lence [119,120]. Focal lesions of the VMPFC and of the
OFC/VL interfere with the normal development of moral
sense and judgment and, moreover, if they occur before
16 years of age, they can lead to severe antisocial behav-
iour, insensitivity to the future consequences of decisions,and to the repeated failure of attempts to correct aberrant
behaviours [121,122]. Patients with focal lesions of the
VMPFC, especially of the right one, show indifference in
front of violations of socio-moral rules, and little empathy
towards the victims [45,73,109,123-130]. Lesions of the
VMPFC may impair feelings of pity, shame, guilt, envy,
unjustified pride, and malice, all involved in one’s own
“point of view” and that of others [121,131,132]. Although
the concept of the theory of mind remains intact, such
individuals cannot understand the others' feelings and
emotions (theory of the affective mind), as it emerges from
tests regarding the sense of irony and the gaffes [126,133].
Patients with lesions of the VMPFC show low or no auto-
nomic responses (such as heart rate, skin conductance,
pupillary reactivity, piloerection, sweating, etc.), especially
to social stimuli [129,134]. In addition, they appear to be
fake, manipulative, and aggressive. Finally, lesions of the
OFC/VL alter both the use of immediate feedback coming
from social signals and emotions, and the control of emo-
tional and impulsive responses [47,68,126,128,132,135-138].
Subsequently, more specific tests designed to explore the
formulation of moral judgments in subjects with lesions in
the VMPFC were utilized. A comparison of seven patients
with 12 control subjects regarding personal, impersonal,
and non-moral dilemmas demonstrated that the former
had a greater propensity to judge violations of personal
morals as acceptable behaviour, and they did so with ex-
treme rapidity and certainty [124]. In a similar study, six pa-
tients with bilateral focal damage of the VMPFC were
examined [126]: they presented a low level of autonomic
activation in response to emotionally-charged images, and
displayed limited empathy, sense of embarrassment and
sense of guilt. In both these studies, the subjects tended to
make utilitarian choices when facing with moral dilemmas.
These results were recently confirmed in patients with le-
sions of the VMPFC, whose variations in skin conductance
were also evaluated as indicators of the emotional state.
These patients, in contrast to the control subjects, chose
solutions with a personal advantage and detriment of
others, with no variation of skin conductance during the
formulation of their moral judgment. It was, thus, hypothe-
sized that the VMPFC is widely involved in the modulation
of moral judgment and in anticipating the emotional conse-
quences of the rule violation [124,126]. It was further
reported that these patients continue to refuse unfair offers
during the “Ultimatum Game” test [139]. This suggests that
when the OFC/VL region is integral, it may be at the basis
of feelings of social aversion, and can continue to apply al-
truistic punishment in situations in which fairness and
intentionality are clear or predefined. Although recent le-
sions at the level of the VMPFC can alter the acquisition of
a moral sense [129,130], subsequently the patients maintain
an intact moral reasoning, and conserve their awareness of
rules and moral conventions [139-142]. These individuals
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ability moral reasoning to anticipate the consequences and
feelings associated with their actions [123,143-147]. It is
noteworthy to mention that split-brain patients judge moral
violations on the basis of the outcome. This is generally
explained by the possibility that the left hemisphere, that
responds verbally to the dilemmas, does not receive inputs
from the right temporoparietal junction, possibly implicated
in belief attribution [58].
The model of frontotemporal dementia (FTD)
Although a number of brain disorders, such as Huntington’s
disease, traumas, and some frontal tumors, can modify
socio-moral behaviours, with no doubt the most import-
ant of these is FTD, given that approximately 50% of the
affected patients present sociopathic behaviours. FTD be-
longs to a family of non-Alzheimer’s degenerative demen-
tias, mainly associated with atrophy of the frontal lobes
and of the anterior portion of the temporal lobes. They
are characterized by behavioral, personality, social con-
duct, and verbal expression disorders, with a relative
maintenance of memory and of topographical orientation.
In contrast to the cognitive and memory deficits typical of
Alzheimer’s dementia, the main symptoms of FTD consist
in the violation of the previously-acquired social norms,
and also of sociopathic behaviours, loss of empathy, and
loss of the perception of feelings and of the awareness of
one’s own behaviour and of its consequences [148]. The
involution of the right frontal area is associated with un-
pleasant social behaviour and altered perception of the
feelings and intentions of others [27-30,149]. These pa-
tients begin to violate social and moral rules during the
early stages of the disease, and commonly a lot of them
demonstrate a reduction of their sense of tact and decency
(including improper physical contacts), and of their verbal
and non-verbal communication [150]. Inappropriate or
transgressive sexual contacts, violence, and aggression are
similarly frequent [151-155]. These sociopathic forms of
behaviour are often associated with alterations of the right
frontal lobe, perhaps at the level of the VMPFC, as re-
vealed by imaging studies [28,150]. Furthermore, some
FTD patients show a greater deficit in the immediate
response to moral dilemmas, compared with patients af-
fected by Alzheimer’s or to control subjects [156]. By utiliz-
ing the relatively intact processes of DLPFC, FTD patients
resolve moral dilemmas in a cold, logical, and calculating
way. Investigations of their personality highlighted a de-
creased empathy when the right OFC/VL is involved, and
interpersonal coldness or reduced emotional empathy in
case of severe alterations of the anterior temporal lobe
[157-159]. Moreover, FTD patients show a particular de-
ficiency in their ability to calibrate the entity of moral
violation, as well as social concepts themselves, espe-
cially when the right anterior temporal lobe is involved[136,146,160,161]. The lack of moral emotions and of
the sense of union between themselves and the others
could explain their impaired moral judgment, as well as
their antisocial behaviours. A selective impairment of
making decisions relative to personal moral judgments is
often seen, notwithstanding a relatively preserved capacity
for moral reasoning [156]. Impersonal responses to viola-
tions of personal morals lead to the hypothesis of an early
neuropathological focus localized in the VMPFC [150].
These characteristics, associated with insufficient control
over impulsivity, due to the involvement of the nearby
OFC/VL, can provide an explanation of the tendency of
these patients towards sudden violations of morals, while
maintaining a full awareness of the consequences. Because
of the early onset of psychic and behavioral disorders, es-
pecially at the beginning, FTD can be confused with a psy-
chiatric disorder. The neuropsychological approach, with
its characterization of different cognitive domains (mem-
ory, language, executive function, praxic and visuospatial
ability), is fundamental for the diagnosis. The second diag-
nostic level is represented by neuroradiologic evaluation,
with the detection of a symmetrical or asymmetrical atro-
phy in the frontal and temporal lobes, while functional
neuroimaging is fundamental to diagnose cases with initial
cerebral atrophy [53,162].
Discussion
Different lines of research suggest that humans are
equipped by an innate morality, the so-called called nor-
mative moral sense, that would result from a neural net-
work including different brain regions, with the main
centre represented by the VMPFC, especially the right one.
A moral judgment and behaviour require, in fact, the inte-
gration of different processes: the decoding of signals per-
ceived by the sensitive organs (thalamus), the activation of
basic emotions (anteromedial temporal lobe, brain stem,
and the nuclei of visceromotor centres), the awareness of
the relevance and importance of the stimuli (VMPFC and
OFC), and the implementation and control of potentially
related forms of behaviours (frontal lobes) [23]. According
to this model, an alteration of one of the cortical or subcor-
tical centres could underlie changes in social behaviour.
The VMPFC, closely connected to the limbic system,
mediates automatic reactions which are evident when one
has to face moral violations [23,26,82]. Brain lesions or
disorders involving the right VMPFC seem to mitigate
moral emotions and responses to dilemmas concerning
both harming the others and the sense of fairness and just-
ice. In fact, patients with such lesions may show different
alterations in their emotional functioning, which include
affective apathy, reduction of empathy, emotional weak-
ness, and difficulty in controlling anger and frustration.
The OFC/VL can control the aversive emotions inherent
to the social sphere, inhibit immediate responses coming
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disinhibition [47,163]. The amygdala mediates response to
fear/anxiety, disgust, and negative social stimuli, and mod-
ulates the understanding of moral or social boundaries, as
well as of certain facial expressions, mainly negative [50].
The lack of reactivity to some stressful stimuli recorded in
some psychopathic subjects has been attributed to amyg-
dala lesions. More extensive bilateral lesions involving also
the adjacent anterior temporal cortex underlie the Klüver-
Bucy syndrome, characterized by an exaggerated tendency
towards the oral and tactile exploration of objects, hyper-
sexuality, bulimia, absence of fear, increased aggression,
memory deficit, and difficulty in recognizing people and
objects [164,165].
A few studies have proposed that this moral network
could be bypassed by rational processes mediated by the
DLPFC, leading to utilitarianism, that is to say, acting for
the greater good of the greatest number of people [45].
The result is the creation of a positive psychological ten-
sion (empathy?) which permits to understand the mental
state of the other (theory of mind) [60]. Unless it is ac-
tively inhibited, the initiation of this process occurs auto-
matically through the mirror neurons, and results in
empathy, emotions, and moral behavior [166-169]. These
new findings, although still preliminary, have a number of
implications. For example, when an individual presents an
unusual behaviour for the first time, or a complete person-
ality change compared to a previous model of behaviour,
the possibility of an underlying neurological disorder
should be taken into account [170]. Similarly, family mem-
bers and acquaintances should also be informed of the
possibility that abnormal behaviour can sometimes be in-
dependent from the willful control of the patient. Further-
more, pharmacological treatments exist for controlling
impulsivity. A discussion of the pharmacological manage-
ment of these impulsive behaviours falls beyond the scope
of this review: it should be only mentioned that a certain
effectiveness has been demonstrated for selective inhibitors
of serotonin reuptake (SSRIs), beta-blockers, and mood
stabilizers, such as valproate, carbamazepine, lamotrigine,
and topiramate.Conclusions
In the past few years, the concept has emerged that there
may exist an innate moral sense which would be at the
basis of those emotions, feelings and behaviours typically
human aiming at promoting group cohesion and cooper-
ation. A specific neural network for this innate moral sense
has been proposed on the basis of clinical observations
showing how alterations in this network could, in part, ex-
plain certain forms of deviant, sociopathic, or criminal be-
haviour. Such findings have been also supported by brain
imaging studies in healthy subjects.Although preliminary, the available data would seem
to suggest that the problem of some forms of criminality
may be rooted in brain alterations. On the other hand,
we cannot invoke only these latter to justify a vicious
act, or to eliminate that personal responsibility which
must be always taken into account.
In any case, this is an emerging area that only recently
has become a topic of neuroscientific investigation and
several questions are still unanswered and need to be
addressed.
If traditional theories underlined the role of higher cog-
nitive processes, latest work stressed the role of emotions
[1], with moral sense deriving from the perfect integration
and integrity of rationality and emotions [4] [26] [61].
Therefore, according to these last authors, both cognitive
and emotional processes “play a crucial and sometimes
mutually competitive roles” in the emergence of moral
judgment. Indeed, utilitarian judgments, mainly regulated
by cognition, requires emotions to be motivated, and the
opposite is true for non-utilitarian judgements [171].
However, there is an urgent need of brain imaging data
contributions based on specific tasks exploring and
assessing the different components of morality.
There also exists another open and great question in
this area regarding the role of environmental influences
and, in particular, of the primary experiences of attach-
ment, education and of interpersonal relationships in
modulating the organization of the moral sense.
The hope is that future neuroscientific research will
provide support to these notions that remain still theor-
etical, although the horizons that they open up are fas-
cinating and not limited to the scientific domain.
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